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THE CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIAHERZEGOVINA
Fred L. Morrison*
The new constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is clearly a transitional document. It is, of course, the
product of civil war, of "ethnic cleansing," and of (well justified)
mutual mistrust. It was created as part of the peace package negotiated at Dayton in November 1995 and accepted by the two
constituent "Entities" (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republic of Srpska) and by the central government
as the new constitution of the internationally recognized Republic. It is the second new constitution to be negotiated with international assistance and encouragement in the course of the
recent hostilities; the first, as amended, now serves as the constitution of the Federation which forms one half of the Republic.!
This new Bosnian constitution makes the American Articles
of Confederation of two centuries ago look like a centralized,
unitary form of government. It distributes almost all governmental authority to the two "Entities," the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (in the territory controlled by the former Croat and
Muslim government) and the Republic of Srpska (in the territory
formerly controlled by the Bosnian Serbs), and then effectively
disables the central government from exercising the few powers
given to it. It thus combines a "minimalist" approach to national
government with a "maximalist" approach to checks and balances. The central government of the new Bosnia has very few
competences and these can be exercised only with acquiescence
of all parties. The constitution is only one of 12 annexes to the
General Framework Agreement on peace in the area. Some of
the other annexes also have constitutional dimensions and will be
discussed here. The protection of human rights, the restoration
of the infrastructure, and the settlement of disputes between the
Entities are all subjects of separate agreements outside of the
constitution itself.
*
I.

Oppenheimer Wolff and Donnelly Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
33 I.L.M. 740 (1994).
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The level of distrust evidenced by the instrument is illustrated by the heavy reliance on "outsiders," i.e., on persons from
outside of the former Yugoslavia, to provide many of the leadership functions of the new government by providing the neutral
tie-breaking vote in many important governmental institutions.
BACKGROUND
A brief word of history is necessary, if only to identify the
players. The former Yugoslavia was nominally a federation of six
republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the days of Tito, the federation operated with an amazing uniformity, at first because of the personal influence of Tito, and later because of the unifying role of
the Communist Party. With the collapse of the communist bloc,
it flew apart. Slovenia quickly became an independent republic,
and Croatia followed soon thereafter. Macedonia also became
independent, but engaged in endless squabbles with Greece over
its name; it is now known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia. Serbia and Montenegro continued a quasi-federal
existence, internationally recognized under the name Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro).2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the most multiethnic of the nations, collapsed into its civil war.
There were really three parties to that conflict: the Bosnian
Serbs. who were initially supported by Serbia, i.e., by Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro); the Bosnian Croats, who were initially
supported by Croatia, but soon came to ally themselves with the
Moslems, and the Bosnian Moslems. who had the leadership of
the Bosnia-Herzegovina government. (There was also another
small group, called simply "Others," who were caught in the middle of all of this, and who considered themselves only citizens of
the region, without ethnic allegiance.3 In this group were some
individuals of Italian extraction. some Jews. and some mixed
families.)
In 1994, under the aegis of the Vance-Owen peace talks, a
constitution was worked out for the portions of Bosnia-Herzego2. None of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia has inherited its international recognition. The Arbitration Commission established by the Conference for Peace
in Yugoslavia ruled that the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been
dissolved and that all of the successors were new states. Opinion No. 9, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 1523 (1992). Most other international organizations have followed suit. Thus all of
the former Yugoslav republics are on an equal footing in international law. This does
create some difficulties with respect to succession to treaty rights and obligations.
3. The "Others" were specifically recognized in the constitution of the Federation,
but are not recognized as a separate group in the constitution of the Republic.
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vina then controlled by the Bosnian government. This called for
a cantonalization of those portions of the country under CroatMoslem control into fairly autonomous provinces, with executive
and legislative bodies representative of the two groups. That
constitution explicitly recognized that the Serbian controlled areas would establish their own framework of government. Maintaining the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and providing
protection for human rights remained national aims. The Serbs,
however, formed the Republic of Srpska, with an apparent view
to its eventual unification with Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro).
THE CONSTITUTION
The Dayton Peace Accords sought to end the ethnic fighting
by providing fixed boundaries between the two warring factions.
Annex 4 to the Framework Agreement contains the text of the
new constitution.4 It preserves the pretense of a single BosniaHerzegovina by establishing a national government overarching
the actual regimes of the two "Entities" (or States) within it.s
One of these was the old Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(in the territory controlled by the Muslims and Croats); the other
was the Republic of Srpska. Note the linguistic anomaly: the
federal or central government is called the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, while the State or "Entity" government is
called the Federation.
The weakness of the new Republic is seen most clearly in
the allocation of powers between the central and Entity levels.
The central government is responsible for foreign affairs, foreign
trade, and currency matters. Virtually everything else-courts,
police, ordinary legislation, local government, education, and
even military affairs-is left to the two Entity governments. The
full list of powers allocated to the central government is set forth
in Article III of the new constitution:
The following matters are the responsibility of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
(a) Foreign policy.
(b) Foreign trade policy.
(c) Customs policy.
(d) Monetary policy as provided in Article VII.
4. The entire Dayton Accords are reproduced at 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996). The Constitution can be found in id. at 117.
5. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. I, § 3.
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(e) Finances of the institutions and for the international
obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(f) Immigration, refugee, and asylum policy and
regulation.
(g) International and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with Interpol.
(h) Establishment and operation of common and international communications facilities.
(i) Regulation of inter-Entity transportation.
U) Air traffic controJ.6

Even within these areas, the choices of the central government
are strictly limited. For the first six year period, the constitution
prohibits the new central bank from "creating money."?
The central government is organized on a federalist
scheme-but one driven to an extreme of states' rights. Everything is apportioned in thirds-one part Serbian, one part Bosniac,s and one part Croatian. The Presidency consists of three
individuals, one from each group.9 The bicameral legislature
consists of an upper house (House of Peoples) with five from
each group, and a lower house (House of Representatives) with
fourteen from each group. Each of these bodies is to have three
presiding officers who rotate in office.to
The checks and balances are honed to a fine degree. The
three-member Presidency is supposed to act by consensus.ll If
that fails, two members may adopt a decision, but the dissenting
member may then declare that decision "destructive of a vital
interest of the Entity from the territory from which he was
elected. "12 In that case, the matter is referred to the legislature
of the ethnic group from which the dissenting member of the
Presidency was elected.t3 If they uphold "their" member of the
Presidency by a two-thirds vote, the challenged action does not
take effect.14
6. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. III, § 1.
7. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. VII, § 1.
8. The Constitution refers to citizens of Bosnian extraction as "Bosniacs." See,
e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. V, § 2(d).
9. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. V.
10. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. IV, §§ 1, 2, 3(b).
11. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. V, § 2(c).
12. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. V, § 2(d).
13. In the case of Srpska, this is its National Assembly; in the case of the Bosniac
and Croat members, it is the members of the upper house of the Federation who are of
that ethnic group. ld.
14.

!d.

1996]

CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

149

The most ominous evidence of the divisions that remain
within the troubled country is to be seen in the provisions relating to the armed forces. With respect to most civilian matters,
the Presidency acts by consensus. With respect to military issues,
however, the Constitution provides: "Each member of the Presidency shall, by virtue of the office, have civilian command authority over armed forces."Ls Clearly, the constitution writers
could not ignore the stark fact that each of the ethnic groups has
its own military force, which will not be responsive to any single
central authority. It may be one country, but it has (at least)
three armies.
In the legislative branch, the Parliamentary Assembly, there
are similar checks and few balances. In the upper house, the
House of the Peoples, a majority of each ethnic group must be
present in order for there to be a quorum,t6 so a dissenting ethnic
group could forestall action if three of its five members fail to
attend sessions. In both houses, the presiding officers are supposed to encourage decisions to be taken with a majority of each
ethnic group concurring. Failing such broad support, a simple
majority may take action, but if two-thirds of an ethnic group
opposes the legislation, it does not take effect.n
There is still another "ethnic veto." A majority of the five
members of the upper house from any one of the ethnic groups
may declare a proposed decision of the legislature to be "destructive of a vital interest" of that ethnic group. Such a declaration
then requires the votes in the upper house to be taken separately;
a majority of each of the three ethnic "caucuses" is necessary for
passage. (If a majority of an ethnic group has already identified
the decision as "destructive," it seems unlikely that a majority of
that same group will vote for the legislation.) If one of the other
ethnic caucuses objects to the declaration, the declaration is first
referred to a joint committee and then to the Constitutional
Court, "which shall in an expedited process review it for procedural regularity."Ls Note that only the procedure of making the
declaration, not its substance, is subject to judicial review.
The legislative body is, however, a relatively powerless institution. Since most of the powers of the central government are
in those fields that are essentially executive, there is little for the
15.
16.
17.
18.

Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina

Const.,
Const.,
Const.,
Const.,

Art.
Art.
Art.
Art.

V, § 5(a).
IV, § 1(b).
IV,§ 3(d).
IV,§§ 3(e), (f).
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parliament to do. Under Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution, the powers of the Parliamentary Assembly are limited to:
(a) Enacting legislation as necessary to implement decisions of the Presidency or to carry out the responsibilities of
the Assembly under this Constitution.
(b) Deciding upon the sources and amounts of revenues
for the operations of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(c) Approving a budget for the institutions of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
(d) Deciding whether to consent to the ratification of
treaties.
(e) Such other matters as are necessary to carry out its
duties or as are assigned to it by mutual agreement of the
Entities.I9

Even these powers are circumscribed by other parts of the constitution. For example, if the Parliamentary Assembly fails to pass
a budget, the budget from the previous year continues in effect.2o
(The government of Bosnia may have little power, but the authors of the constitution, sitting in Dayton during a period of
shutdown of the United States government, were aware of the
possibility of even further stalemate.) Although the national
government may collect taxes (e.g., the customs duties provided
under its authority), it is expected that the bulk of national revenue will come from assessments on the two Entities. The Federation will contribute two-thirds and Srpska will contribute onethird. With tight control of the purse strings, the two Entity governments will be able to control central action.
The structure of the Constitutional Court also demonstrates
the delicate balancing of the situation. It will have nine members, including two from each ethnic group (appointed by that
group), and three foreign neutrals, appointed by the President of
the European Court of Human Rights "after consultation with
the Presidency."21 The Court will have very limited jurisdiction.
It will have original jurisdiction in cases arising between the Entities, between the Entities and the central government, or between organs of the central government.22 It also will have
appellate jurisdiction only over cases involving constitutional is19.
20.
21.
22.

Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina

Const.,
Const.,
Const.,
Const.,

Art.
Art.
Art.
Art.

IV,§ 4.
VIII, § 2.
VI, § 1.
VI, § 3(a).
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sues.z3 In human rights cases, it will have jurisdiction on referral
of legal questions from courts in either of the two Entities.z4 This
distinction may be mischievous. The only direct right of access
for a litigant will be in constitutional cases. In other "human
rights" cases, the litigant will be forced to rely upon the willingness of the local court to refer the matter to the Constitutional
Court for its decision. Because human rights issues are fundamentally interwoven into the constitution, it may be possible for
litigants to characterize them as involving constitutional issues.
Other than the Constitutional Court, there is no provision for a
federal judiciary.
Several other provisions of the constitution deserve special
note, including the protection of human rights, the provisions
permitting the two Entities to enter into agreements with neighboring states, and the effort to exclude the greatest offenders of
the war from political leadership positions. The intense commitment to human rights, both within the constitution and in the
other agreements that are part of the Dayton accords, is discussed separately below.
One unusual provision permits each of the Entities to "establish special parallel relationships with neighboring states consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and
Herzegovina."zs Unlike most national constitutions, which normally forbid or limit their States from entering into foreign compacts, this document specifically authorizes such agreements.
This will primarily permit Srpska to enter into various arrangements with neighboring Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
without violating either the Accords or the constitution. A gradual absorption of many governmental services into the ambit of
Belgrade is to be expected, since only foreign affairs and foreign
trade are effectively within the scope of powers exercised by the
central government and thus excluded from the parallel arrangements. Disputes about whether a "special parallel relationship"
violates these standards may be decided by the Constitutional
Court.26

23. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. VI, § 3(b).
24. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. VI,§ 3(c). The relationship between the Constitutional Court and the Human Rights Chamber, created by a separate annex to the
Dayton peace settlement, remains unclear.
25. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. III, § 2(a).
26. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. VI,§ 3(a).
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HUMAN RIGHTS
The world has been appalled by the violations of human
rights in the Former Yugoslavia. The Dayton Agreements address this issue in two ways. Human rights are the subject of Article II of the constitution. An institutional framework for
dealing with human rights issues is also spelled out fully in a separate agreement, which is Annex 6 of the Accords. The constitution also contains provisions prohibiting discrimination27 and
protecting refugees.2s
Although the constitution contains a catalog of human rights
to be protected by the Republic,29 the most interesting provision
is the adoption of human rights norms by reference: "The rights
and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its
Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These
shall have priority over all other law."3o This has the effect of
incorporating the highly developed law of the European Convention, as developed by the European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights, directly into the Bosnian
constitution, making it the supreme law of the land. Such a noble
aspiration is to be applauded. Bringing it to realization will be
the more difficult task.
The constitution also requires the national government to
become (or remain) a party to fifteen listed international human
rights agreements. These include the Genocide Convention, the
Geneva Conventions (including the protocols protecting persons
in times of internal war), the United Nations Covenants on Civil
and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, and European and international conventions on the protection of minorities.31
Separate from the constitution, but referred to in it,32 the
central government and the two Entities entered into an Agreement on Human Rights.33 It not only contains a list of rights
parallel to that in the constitution, but also establishes a series of
mechanisms to enforce them. There are an Ombudsman and a
27. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. II, § 4.
28. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. II, § 5.
29. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. II, § 3.
30. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. II, § 2.
31. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. II, § 7, and Annex I to the Constitution.
32. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. II, § 1.
33. Annex 6 to the Dayton Accords, 35 I.L.M. 130 (1996) ("Human Rights
Agreement").
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Human Rights Chamber.34 These bodies are responsible for considering alleged violations of the provisions of the European
Convention as well as alleged discrimination by official action.3s
In the initial stages, the Ombudsman will be an individual from
outside of the geographic area, to be appointed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Helsinki Declaration organization.36 The Ombudsman's function is
to investigate (both on the basis of allegations and on the basis of
apparent violations) as well as to make reports.37 Enforcement
functions are, however, limited to forwarding reports to the various parties or initiating proceedings in the Human Rights
Chamber.3B
The Human Rights Chamber is to be composed of fourteen
members, but normally acts in two chambers of seven members
each.39 There will be two Croats, two Bosniacs, and two Serbs,
each appointed by their own governments,4o and eight outside
members, appointed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the Strasbourg organization.4I Each seven member chamber will thus consist of three members from the ethnic
groups and four outsiders. It has jurisdiction to review complaints filed by individuals or by the Ombudsman and may issue
decisions that are binding on any of the governments.4z After
five years, at the end of the year 2000. administration of the
human rights machinery will revert to the central government,
unless the parties otherwise agree.43
Another side agreement, Annex 7 to the Accords, establishes a regime for refugees.44 Under that agreement, refugees
and displaced persons have the right to return to their homes
where they are entitled to protection by the local authorities,
even if they are _members of the minority. They are entitled to a
general amnesty for all crimes connected with the conflict, except
those defined as "serious violation[ s] of international humanita34. Human Rights Agreement, Art. II,§ 1.
35. Human Rights Agreement, Art. II, § 2.
36. Human Rights Agreement, Art. IV, § 2.
37. Human Rights Agreement, Art. V.
38. Human Rights Agreement, Art. V, § 7.
39. Human Rights Agreement, Art. VII, § 1; Art. X, § 2.
40. The two Croat and two Bosniac members will be appointed by the Federation;
the two Serb members by Srpska. Human Rights Agreement, Art. VII, § 2.
41. Human Rights Agreement, Art. VII, § 2.
42. Human Rights Agreement, Art. XI, §§ 3, 6.
43. Human Rights Agreement, Art. XIV.
44. Annex 7 to the Dayton Accords, 35 I.L.M. 136 (1996) ("Agreement on Refugees
and Displaced Persons").
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rian law" by the Statute of the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal.45
Again the issue will be supervised by a commission, consisting of
six representatives of the three conflicting factions and three appointed by the President of the European Court of Human
Rights.46
OTHER SIDE AGREEMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS
The constitution is, of course, part of a package-the Dayton Accords. Unlike the basic agreement, which is signed by the
three internationally recognized governments, the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e., the central government), Croatia,
and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the constitution was
"accepted" by the two Entities, Srpska, and the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The whole package, however, contains additional elements
of a constitutional character. Annex 5 of the Agreement commits the two Entities to arbitration of disputes between them.47
No details are provided, but presumably this is separate and independent of any reference of these disputes to the Constitutional Court. Again, this is a sign of the expected weakness of
the institutions of the new national government.
Annex 9 creates a commission to establish joint public corporations of the two Entities to operate such activities as railroads and communications facilities.48 The fragility of the
situation is underscored by the fact that this task was not given to
the central government, but rather to a joint venture of the two
Entities, to be presided over by a neutral chair selected by the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.49 Indeed,
the central government is not even a party to the instrument creating this commission; it will be run by the two Entities and the
neutral overseers without central participation. It is to establish
a transportation corporation and may establish other public corporations for services such as posts and communications.so
45. Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Art. VI.
46. Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Art. IX, § 1.
47. 35 I.L.M. 129 (1996).
48. 35 I.L.M. 144 (1996) ("Agreement on Establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Public Corporations").
49. Agreement on Establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations,
Art. I, § 2.
50. Agreement on Establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations,
Art. II, § 1; Art. 3.
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Another separate agreement establishes a Commission to
Preserve National Monuments.s1 Here again, two members will
come from the Federation, one from Srpska, and two will be appointed by the Director-General of UNESCO.s2
CONCLUSIONS
The constitution and its accompanying documents confirm
the fragility of the situation and the difficulties that confronted
the negotiators who set forth to create a peace settlement. Several factors deserve special notice.
The consistent pattern of checks and balances has created a
system in which unanimous agreement of the three factions is
necessary for any governmental action at the central level. This
is no "Connecticut compromise" in which there is a balancing of
power. Each of the Entities possesses a virtually absolute veto
over the activities of the central government. This may have produced a consensus within the time limits available for settlement
in Dayton, but it is hardly auspicious for the functioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a modern national state.
In light of the weakness of the central government, the provision for cooperation agreements with neighboring states is a
thinly disguised effort to make it possible for the Republic of
Srpska to achieve most of the elements of its war aims, including
unification with Serbia, while preserving the identity of BosniaHerzegovina as a national state as a legal fiction. Indeed, it may
be an incentive for the Croat-dominated sections of the Federation to seek similar arrangements with Croatia. In short, the idea
of a single Bosnia won on paper, but not in reality. This decision
may have significant consequences in other ethnic conflicts, because it may provide some evidence that ethnic separatists can
get most of what they want.
The multiple mechanisms that call for the appointment of
the controlling members of important national institutions to be
foreigners, selected by foreigners, reemphasize the absence of
national unity. Table I indicates their positions and the appointing authorities. The list of appointing authorities also emphasizes the number of public international organizations that
have become involved in the attempt to settle the problem. Each
seems to have obtained a responsibility for management of some
part of the troubled life of Bosnia for five years, or perhaps
51.
52.

Annex 8, 35 I.L.M. 141 (1966) ("National Monuments").
National Monuments, Art. II, § 1.
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TABLE I

Institution
Constitutional Court

Membership on Bosnian
Governmental Bodies
Bos.
Croat.
Serb.
Foreign
2
2
2
3

Central Bank
Governors

1*

1*

1

1

Ombudsman

0

0

0

1

Human Rights
Chamber

2**

2**

2

8

Commission for
Displaced Persons
and Refugees

2**

2**

2

3

Commission to
Preserve National
Monuments

1

1

1

2

Commission on
Public Corporations

1

1

1

2

Foreign
Members
Appointed By
President,
European
Court of
Human Rights
International
Monetary Fund
Chairman of
Organization
for Security
and
Cooperation in
Europe
(OSCE)
Committee of
Ministers of
the Council of
Europe
President,
European
Court of
Human Rights
DirectorGeneral,
UNESCO

President.
European
Bank for
Reconstruction
and
Development
* The Bosniac and Croat members each have one-half vote; the foreign
member has an additional tie-breaking vote.
** Technically the Federation names 4; an even split between Bosniac and
Croatians is assumed.

more. These are in addition to the roles of NATO in preserving
the peace, and of the United Nations High Representative in coordinating the other activities of international organizations in
rebuilding the country.s3 Most of these transitional arrangements are for a five year period. They will expire in December
53.

Annex 10, 35 I.L.M. 146 (1996).
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2000. At that time, the central government of the Republic is
supposed to assume responsibility for the appointment of members of these public bodies, unless all of the parties agree otherwise. Although the first real test of the viability of this
arrangement will come shortly after the NATO peacekeepers depart in late 1996, another test of the success of the constitution
will come when the central government is to take over these governmental responsibilities from the foreign intervenors. If the
healing process has been thorough, the central authorities may
be able to resume many of these functions. If it has been only
adequate, the parties may agree to continue the foreign administrations of these functions for a few years into the future. If it
has failed, there may be partition or even renewal of the
hostilities.
These arrangements may be situation-specific, but they may
have a more general significance. Nation states, which once asserted an exclusivity of their internal administrative apparatus
and a virtually unconditional requirement that their governors
also be their citizens, may be undergoing radical transformation.
For virtually all Europeans. the participation of the regional European Court of Human Rights in deciding the validity of national actions is commonplace. For those in the European
Union, participation of that organization in planning the economic policy of the country, with a broader perspective in mind,
is also an accepted derogation from stronger forms of traditional
sovereignty. We may be entering a time in which the geographic
nation state no longer has the exclusivity of governing power that
it once claimed. With that change, constitutions may become increasingly complex.
Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to be a troubled place. Its
peace is held together by a military presence from NATO that is
monitoring the lines between the two Entities that form the nation. An international police task force is providing additional
enforcement.s4 The constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina is thus
clearly a transitional document. Like the Articles of Confederation of the United States, it is too weak to maintain a long lasting
nation state. Whether the transition is toward a more effective
constitutional structure in which a community will emerge, or toward a more formal dismemberment cannot be answered yet. It
is clear, however, that the constitution produces a much looser
confederation than that of any other geographic unit that purports to be a single nation state.
54.

Annex 11, 35 I.L.M. 149 (1996).

